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Available online 19 January 2006The feedback error-related negativity (fERN) is a component of the event-related brain
potential elicited in gambling and trial-and-error learning tasks by negative, but not
positive, feedback stimuli. Here, we present the results of a series of five experiments that
investigated the response of the fERN to the presentation of neutral feedback stimuli. In
three of the experiments, the neutral feedback stimuli indicated that the participants did
not receive a potential reward nor incur a potential penalty (i.e., they received nothing); and
in the remaining two experiments, the neutral feedback stimuli did not convey any
meaningful information (i.e., the participants were either successful or unsuccessful on
those trials, but the feedback stimuli were uninformative about the outcomes). Across the
five experiments, we found that neutral feedback stimuli elicited a fERN about as large as
that elicited by negative feedback stimuli. This result is consistent with recent proposals
that the evaluative system that produces the fERN classifies outcomes into two categories:
those outcomes that indicate that a goal has been satisfied and those that do not.
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In recent years, a surge of interest has focused on the neural
mechanisms that underlie how humans learn to pursue
reward and avoid punishment (Cohen and Blum, 2002). A
window onto this system has been provided by the discovery
of a component of the event-related brain potential (ERP)
called the “feedback error-related negativity” (fERN or “feed-
back negativity”). The fERN is a negative deflection in the ERP
that is distributed over frontal areas of the scalp and that
reaches maximum amplitude about 250 ms following the
onset of negative feedback stimuli. Negative feedback stimuli
are stimulus events that indicate that an undesirable outcome
has occurred, such as an error or a loss of money. Importantly,
presentation of positive feedback stimuli (that indicate that a
“good” event has occurred) does not elicit the fERN, indicating
that the system that produces this component is differentially
sensitive to positive and negative feedback (Miltner et al.,
1997). According to the “reinforcement learning theory of the
error-related negativity” (RL-ERN theory), the evaluative
information indexed by the fERN is conveyed via themidbrain
dopamine system from a monitoring system located in the
basal ganglia to a decision making system located in anterior
cingulate cortex, where that information can be applied for the
adaptive modification of behavior. Further, the theory pro-
poses that the amplitude of the fERN depends on both the
valence and the expectedness of the outcome, such that the
largest fERNs are elicited by relatively unexpected negative
events (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) (see also Holroyd, 2004).
Thus, for example, infrequent penalties elicit larger fERNs
than are elicited by infrequent rewards, frequent rewards, and
frequent penalties (Holroyd et al., 2003) (but see Hajcak et al.,
2005). This position has received some preliminary support in
a series of recent studies (reviewed in Holroyd et al., 2004b;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004).
In one of these studies, participants engaged in a pseudo
trial-and-error learning task in which the amount of reward
possible on each trial was varied by condition (Holroyd et al.,
2004a). On each trial, the participants selected one of three
balloons that appeared on a computer screen and were
presented with a feedback stimulus that indicated the receipt
of a small financial reward or penalty. In each condition, the
feedback stimuli were comprised of three types. In a “win”
condition, the feedback indicated that the participants either
received no reward, received a small reward, or received a
large reward, whereas in a “lose” condition, the feedback
indicated that they either lost nothing, incurred a small
penalty, or incurred a large penalty. Further, in an “even”
condition, the feedback indicated that the participants either
incurred a penalty, received nothing, or received a reward.
Unbeknownst to the participants, the feedback stimuli in each
condition were random and equiprobable. The results of the
experiment indicated that the system that produced the fERN
was sensitive to the task context in which each outcome
occurred. For example, feedback stimuli indicating that the
participant had neither gained nor lost anything elicited a
fERN in the win condition but not in the lose condition. In
general, the “worst” possible outcome in each condition
elicited the fERN, and the “best” possible outcome did not.These results were interpreted in terms of the RL-ERN theory,
which predicts for this task that the system will come to
expect an intermediate outcome in each condition such that
the best and worst outcomes reflect deviations from this
expectation.
However, an apparent inconsistency with this theoretical
prediction was that in this experiment, the amplitudes of the
fERNs elicited by the intermediate andworst outcomes in each
condition were not significantly different from each other. At
face value, the RL-ERN theory would appear to predict that the
amplitude of the fERN associated with the intermediate
outcome should be midway between the amplitudes asso-
ciated with the worst and best outcomes. This finding was
considered in the light of two possibilities: (1) the study lacked
the statistical power necessary to resolve any difference in
amplitude between the fERNs elicited by the intermediate and
worst outcomes; and 2) the evaluative system that produces
the fERNmay be non-linear, such that the systemweights the
worst and middle outcomes about equally. Importantly, two
recent studies have provided some support for the latter
possibility. Both studies found that the fERNwas insensitive to
gradations of reward magnitude and appeared to reflect a
binary categorization of the outcomes as either good or not
good (Hajcak et al., in press; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004).
Although two other recent studies also included neutral
feedback stimuli, in one of these experiments, the neutral
feedback stimuli occurred relatively infrequently (Muller et al.,
2005) and somay have confounded fERN amplitude with other
ERP components (Holroyd, 2004); and in the other experiment,
the fERN elicited by the neutral feedback stimuli was not
examined (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b).
In the present study, we explored the effect of neutral
feedback stimuli on the amplitude of the fERN in a series of
five experiments (each associated with a different group of
participants). Our purpose was two-fold. First, we wished to
determine whether the observed lack of a difference
between the fERNs elicited by the neutral and worst
outcomes in Holroyd et al. (2004a) would be replicated.
Second, we wished to find out if this phenomenon is robust
to a variety of experimental manipulations, including certain
particulars of the task context. To start, Experiment 1
replicated the “even” condition described in Holroyd et al.
(2004a). As with the previous experiment, the feedback
stimuli on each trial indicated that participants received
either a loss (−10¢), a gain (+10¢), or nothing (0¢). In
Experiment 2, we wished to see if the system that produces
the fERN evaluates uninformative feedback as it does
intermediate outcomes in general. Thus, Experiment 2 was
identical to Experiment 1, except that the participants in
Experiment 2 were told that the neutral feedback stimulus
was uninformative: they were told that although they either
received or lost money on such trials, the feedback did not
indicate which outcome actually occurred. In Experiment 3,
because the evaluative system's assessments can be
“anchored” relative to a reference point (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), we examined whether the amount of the
starting bonus affected the amplitude of the fERN elicited by
the neutral feedback stimuli. At the start of both Experi-
ments 1 and 2, participants were provided with $0 in bonus
money; they were told that although they could accumulate
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task owing the experimenter money. For this reason, in
Experiment 3 we replicated Experiment 1, with the exception
that participants began the task with a $5 bonus and were
told that they would finish the experiment with between $0
and $10. In Experiment 4, we asked whether the large fERN
elicited by neutral feedback stimuli was specific to gambling
tasks. We conducted a time estimation task in which, on
each trial, participants were asked to press a button when
they believed that a second had elapsed following a warning
cue (cf., Miltner et al., 1997). The feedback stimuli in this task
indicated that participants' responses were either on-time,
not on-time, or (on one third of the trials selected at
random) were uninformative. Finally, in Experiment 5, we
asked whether the fERN elicited by the neutral feedback
stimuli could be affected by a predictive cue presented at the
start of the trial that indicated the potential size of the
forthcoming outcome.
These experiments were conducted at two separate
institutions using similar, but not identical, methods. For
ease of exposition, we present Experiments 1–4 (Princeton
University) together first, followed by Experiment 5 (University
of Delaware).
2. Experiments 1–4
2.1. Materials and methods
2.1.1. Participants and tasks
2.1.1.1. Experiment 1. In this pseudo trial-and-error learn-
ing task, participants used feedback stimuli to select
between three “balloons” presented on a computer screen
(cf., Holroyd et al., 2004a). 10 participants (7 male, 3 female),
age 20 ± 1 years, participated for pay ($20) or course credit
and were also given a $5 bonus at the end of the session
(see below). The participants sat comfortably in an electro-
magnetically shielded room about 1 m from a computer
screen. On each trial, the imperative stimulus consisted of
three circles in a row (i.e., “O O O” 0.6° high, 5° wide, blue
color against a black background), and were asked to
imagine that each circle was a “balloon”. Before the task
began, participants were told that one of the three balloons
contained 10¢, another balloon contained a “gremlin” that
would steal 10¢ from them, and a third balloon was empty.
The imperative stimulus remained on the screen until the
participants selected a balloon by pressing one of three
buttons on a response pad. At the time of the response, the
imperative stimulus was replaced with a second stimulus
(0.6° high, 5° wide, blue color, 1.0-s duration) in which the
selected balloon was replaced by an asterisk (e.g., “O O * ”, if
the participant selected the rightmost balloon). This was
followed by a feedback stimulus that appeared directly
above the location associated with the middle balloon (0.6°,
red color, 1.0-s duration): either a ‘+’ (positive feedback,
+10¢), ‘−’ (negative feedback, −10¢), or ‘o’ (neutral feedback,
+0¢) stimulus. A black screen was then presented for 0.5 s
before the onset of the following imperative stimulus.
Participants were told that they should respond in a waythat maximized the total amount of money earned, that at
the end of the experiment, they would be rewarded the
money they found, and that they would not end the
experiment owing money. Unbeknownst to them, the feed-
back stimuli were selected at random (with replacement)
and were equiprobable (1/3 probability for each of the three
feedback types). The experiment consisted of 3 blocks of 100
trials. At the end of the experiment, participants were
informed about the feedback probabilities and told that they
did not make any money. However, they were given a $5
consolation bonus.
2.1.1.2. Experiment 2. 10 participants (5 male, 5 female),
age 21 ± 1 years, participated for pay ($20) or for course
credit. Participants also received a $5.00 bonus at the end of
the session. The experiment was identical to Experiment 1,
except that before the task began, the participants were told
that the neutral feedback stimulus (‘o’) was uninformative,
i.e., although they either gained or lost money on that trial,
the stimulus did not indicate the outcome. Participants
engaged in 3 blocks of 99 trials; the three feedback types
were selected at random (without replacement) and were
equiprobable.
2.1.1.3. Experiment 3. 10 participants (4 male, 6 female),
age 20 ± 1 years, participated for pay ($20) or for course credit.
This experiment was identical to Experiment 1, except that
participants began it with $5.00 in bonusmoney, andwere told
that they would leave the experiment with a bonus between
$0 and $10.
2.1.1.4. Experiment 4. This was a “time estimation task”
in which, on each trial, participants estimated when they
believed a 1-s interval had elapsed following presentation of a
warning tone (cf., Miltner et al., 1997). 10 participants (4 male,
6 female), age 21 ± 2 years, participated for pay ($20) or for
course credit. On each trial, participants were presented with
a tone (800 Hz, 50-ms duration, ∼65 db) and were required to
press a button on a response pad when they believed that 1.0
s had elapsed following the onset of the tone. 0.6 s following
the response, participants were presented with a feedback
stimulus (0.6°, red color on a black background, 1.0-s dura-
tion) that indicated that their response was either “on time”
(positive feedback, ‘+’) or “not on time” (negative feedback,
‘−’). Responses were considered on time if the RT occurred
within a window from 1.0 − α s to 1.0 + α s following tone
onset, where α equaled 0.1 s at the start of each block of trials
and, at the end of each trial, was incremented by 10 ms if the
proportion of errors in the block was greater than 50% and
was decremented by 10 ms if that proportion was less than
50%. Participants engaged in 1 block of 225 trials. On 1/3 of the
trials, selected at random (with replacement), a neutral
feedback stimulus (‘o’) was substituted in lieu of the actual
feedback. At the start of the task, participants were told that
the neutral feedback stimulus was uninformative and thus
did not indicate whether their response was on time or
not. (In a “2-feedback” condition, participants also engaged
in 1 block of 150 trials in which only positive and negative
feedback stimuli were presented, without any uninfor-
mative feedback. This condition, the order of which was
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back condition, replicated previous observations of the
fERN (Miltner et al., 1997) and will not be discussed here
further).
2.1.2. Data acquisition
An electrode cap with Ag/AgCl electrodes was applied to
each participant. The electroencephalogram (EEG) was
recorded along the midline according to the 10–20 system
from channels FPz, AFz, Fz, FCz, CZ, CPz, and Pz (Jasper,
1958). Other electrodes were placed on the right mastoid,
above and below the right eye, and on the outer canthi of
both eyes. The electrode common was placed on the chin or
on the cheek. All electrode recordings were referenced to an
electrode placed on the left mastoid. EEG data were recorded
with Sensorium Inc. (Charlotte, VT) EPA-6 128 channel
Electro-Physiology Amplifiers at a sample rate of 250 Hz.
Experimental control and data acquisition were controlled
by E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA)
and Cogniscan (Newfoundland, NJ), respectively. Participants
completed a short questionnaire upon completion of the
experiment.
2.1.3. Data analysis
For each feedback stimulus, a 1-s epoch of data (0.2 s
baseline) was extracted from the continuous data file for
analysis. Ocular artifact was corrected with an eye move-
ment correction algorithm (Gratton et al., 1983). The EEG
data were re-referenced offline to linked-mastoid electrodes
by subtracting from each sample of data recorded at each
channel one-half the activity recorded at the right mastoid.
The data were baseline corrected by subtracting from each
sample the average activity of that channel during the
baseline period. The EEG data were lowpass filtered below
20 Hz with the Interactive Data Language (Research
systems, Inc., Boulder, CO) digital filter algorithm. ERPs
were created for each participant by averaging the single-
trial EEG according to feedback type. FERN amplitude was
measured base to peak at channel FCz, where it reached a
maximum (cf., Holroyd et al., 2004a) using an algorithm
described in Holroyd et al. (2003). First, the algorithm
identified the sample associated with the most positive
value of the ERP within a 160–240 ms window following the
presentation of the feedback stimulus. The latency of this
sample was taken as the time of onset of the negativity.
Then the algorithm identified the sample associated with
the most negative value of the ERP within a window
extending from the onset of the negativity to 325 ms
following the presentation of the feedback stimulus. If the
latency of this sample was 325 ms (i.e., at the edge of the
window), then the ERP component was considered to be a
positivity, and the amplitude of the negativity was taken as
0 mV. Otherwise, the latency of the sample was taken as
the time of maximum component amplitude. The ampli-
tude of the negativity was then defined by the difference in
the ERP values associated with the component maximum
and the component onset.
The data were submitted to an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with repeated measures and to paired t tests.
The Greenhouse–Geisser correction for repeated mea-sures was applied where appropriate (Keselman and
Rogan, 1980).
2.2. Results
Fig. 1 shows ERPs elicited by the positive, neutral, and
negative feedback stimuli recorded at channel FCz for
Experiment 1–4. A two-way ANOVA on experimental group
and feedback type, with repeated measures on feedback
type, revealed a main effect of feedback type on fERN
amplitude, F(2,72) = 23.6, P b 0.0001, ∈ = 0.83, but no main
effect of experimental group, P = 0.42, and no interaction
between experimental group and feedback type, P = 0.14.
Confidence intervals associated with Bonferroni multiple
comparisons indicated that negative outcomes elicited larger
fERNs than positive outcomes [−3.8 μV, −1.4 μV], and that
neutral outcomes elicited larger fERNs than positive out-
comes [−4.2 μV, −1.8 μV]. In contrast, fERN amplitudes
associated with negative and neutral outcomes did not
differ [−0.8 μV, 1.6 μV], Cohen's d = 0.16. Note that these
confidence intervals, taken together with the absence of a
significant interaction between experimental group and
feedback type, indicate that fERN amplitudes associated
with negative and neutral outcomes were not significantly
different for each experimental group.
3. Experiment 5
3.1. Materials and methods
3.1.1. Participants and task
Twenty-three (5 male, 18 female) University of Delaware
psychology students participated in the current experiment
for course credit. In addition, participants were informed that
they could receive between $0.00 and $10.00 based on their
performance in the task. All participants were told that they
began the task with $5.00, and that at the conclusion of the
experiment, they would keep the money they found. Partici-
pants were also told that they would not end the experiment
owing the experimenters money.
The task was administered on a Pentium I class computer
using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.)
to control stimulus presentation and timing. All participants
were told that, on each trial, they could win, break even, or
lose money. At the start of each trial a cue (‘5’ or ‘25’, 1.0 s,
white color against a black background) presented in the
center of the screen indicated to the participant whether the
upcoming trial was worth 5¢ or 25¢. A graphic representing
three doors in a horizontal line appeared immediately
following cue offset and remained on the screen until the
participant responded (cf., Hajcak et al., 2005). Before the start
of the task, the participants were told that each trial's
specified reward (+5¢ or +25¢), penalty (−5¢ or −25¢), and
nothing (±0¢) were hidden behind the three doors. Participants
were instructed to choose a door by pressing the left ‘ctrl’,
spacebar, and right ‘ctrl’ keys (corresponding to the left,
center, and right door, respectively). Following their decision,
a black screen appeared for 0.5 s, followed by the feedback
stimulus (1.0 s, green color against a black background). The
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‘−’, and ‘o’ stimuli, respectively. The interval between offset of
the feedback stimulus and the onset of the following cue was
1.0 s. All cue and feedback stimuli occupied approximately 2°
of visual angle horizontally and 2° vertically. A fixation mark
(approximately 2° by 2° of visual angle, white color on a
black background) appeared immediately following the parti-
cipant's decision and remained on the screen until the onset
of the feedback stimulus.
After a practice block of 40 trials in which no money
could be won or lost, participants performed 240 trials of
the experiment. Unknown to the participants, the feedback
was pseudo-random and predetermined such that each
feedback stimulus was presented with equal frequency;
additionally, exactly 50% of all trials were preceded by the
‘5’ cue. Thus, there were a total of 40 trials of each type (‘5’
followed by ‘+’, ‘5’ followed by ‘o’, ‘5’ followed by ‘−’, ‘25’
followed by ‘+’, and so on). Each participant ended the
experiment with $5.00.
3.1.2. Data analysis
The EEG was recorded using a Neurosoft Quik-Cap (El Paso,
TX). Recordingswere taken from 3 locations along themidline:
frontal (Fz), central (Cz), and parietal (Pz). In addition, Med-
Associates tin electrodes (St. Albans, VT) were placed on the
left and right mastoids (M1 and M2, respectively). During the
recording, all activity was referenced to Cz. The electrooculo-
gram (EOG) was recorded using Med-Associates miniature
electrodes placed approximately 1 cm above and below the
participant's right eye. The right earlobe served as a ground
site. All EEG/EOG electrode impedances were below 10 K, and
the data from all channels were recorded by a Grass Model 7D
polygraph with Grass Model 7P1F preamplifiers (bandpass
0.05–35 Hz).
All bioelectric signals were digitized on a laboratory
microcomputer using VPM software (Cook, 1992). The EEG
was sampled at 200 Hz. Data collection began with the
participants' response (0.5 s prior to feedback) and continued
for 1.5 s. Off-line, the EEG for each trial was corrected for
vertical EOG artifacts using the method developed by Gratton
et al. (1983) and then re-referenced to the average activity of
the mastoid electrodes. Trials were rejected and not counted
in subsequent analysis if there was excessive physiological
artifact (i.e., 25 ms of invariant analog data on any channel or
A/D values on any channel that equaled that converter's
minimum or maximum values). Single trial EEG data were
lowpass filtered at 20 Hz with an FIR digital filter as per Cook
and Miller (1992).
Finally, stimulus-locked ERPs were averaged based on
trial value (5¢ and 25¢) and feedback type (negative, neutral,
positive). The fERN was quantified at Fz (where it reached
maximum amplitude; note that channel FCz was not used
in this experiment) using the algorithm described in
Experiments 1–4 and Holroyd et al. (2003). Following the
convention of this laboratory (Hajcak et al., in press), the
window for determining fERN onset extended from 150 ms
to 350 ms after feedback stimulus presentation, and the
window for determining the peak of the fERN extended
from the time of fERN onset to 350 ms after feedback
stimulus presentation.3.2. Results
Fig. 2 presents the ERPs (recorded at channel Fz) elicited by
the negative, neutral, and positive feedback stimuli on 5¢
(top) and 25¢ (bottom) trials. As suggested by inspection of
the figure, a 3 (feedback type) × 2 (trial value) repeated
measures ANOVA on fERN amplitude revealed a main effect
feedback type, F(2,46) = 7.08, P b 0.01, ∈ = 0.74. In contrast,
the main effect of trial value, F(1,23) = 1.14, P N 0.25, and the
interaction of trial value and feedback type, F(2,46) = 1.75,
P N 0.15, ∈ = 0.96, did not reach significance. Post hoc
comparisons between negative, neutral, and positive condi-
tions indicated the fERN was larger following penalties than
following rewards, t(23) = 2.85, P b 0.01, and larger following
neutral outcomes than following rewards, t(23) = 2.97,
P b 0.01, but was not significantly different in amplitude
between penalties and neutral outcomes, t(23) = 1.23,
P N 0.20, Cohen's d = −0.15. These data indicate that the
fERNs elicited by penalties and neutral outcomes were both
significantly larger than that elicited by rewards but were
not significantly different from each other. Additionally, the
trial value did not appear to affect the amplitude of the
fERN.
4. Discussion
Across five experiments, negative and neutral feedback
stimuli elicited fERNs that were larger than that elicited by
positive feedback stimuli but that were comparable in
amplitude to one another. This result was sustained despite
significant variations in task design, including the partici-
pants' starting bonuses and the type of information conveyed
by the neutral feedback stimuli. Given that the findings were
consistent across these five experiments as well as with the
previous experiments reported by Holroyd et al. (2004a), which
collectively have involved 95 participants, and given that
typical fERN experiments involve samples sizes of 10–15
participants, it seems unlikely that the failure to find a
relatively small fERN elicited by neutral feedback stimuli
could be due to the sample sizes employed. Indeed, inspection
of Figs. 1 and 2 seems to suggest that the neutral feedback
stimuli elicited larger fERNs than did the negative feedback
stimuli, but this finding was not significant—even when
tested using an omnibus ANOVA across four experiments.
Thus, it appears that the evaluative system that produces the
fERN treats neutral and negative feedback stimuli in much the
same way. This finding is consistent with the results of recent
studies that have indicated that the evaluative system that
produces the fERN categorizes outcomes in a binary manner
(Hajcak et al., in press; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004). Evidently, the
system classifies outcomes into two distinct categories: those
outcomes that indicate that the task goal has been satisfied,
and everything else. According to this view, the evaluative
system that produces the fERN lumps the neutral and negative
feedback stimuli together into a single category containing
any outcomes that leave open the possibility that the goal has
not been obtained.
Can the results of this study be reconciled with the RL-ERN
theory? A face-value interpretation of the theory suggests that
Fig. 1 – Event-related potentials elicited by negative, neutral,
and positive feedback stimuli in Experiments 1–4. Data
recorded from channel FCz. Abscissa: time (ms); 0 ms
denotes time of stimulus onset. Ordinate: voltage (μV). Note
that negative is plotted up by convention.
Fig. 2 – Event-related potentials elicited by negative, neutral,
and positive feedback stimuli in Experiment 5 on 5¢ trials
(top) and 25¢ trials (bottom). Data recorded from channel Fz.
Abscissa: time (ms); 0 ms denotes time of stimulus onset.
Ordinate: Voltage (μV). Note that negative is plotted up by
convention.
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value in each of these experiments, such that the best and
worst outcomes reflect positive and negative deviations,
respectively, from this expectation. If such were the case,
then the neutral feedback stimuli should elicit fERNs that are
intermediate in amplitude between that elicited by negative
and positive feedback stimuli (Holroyd et al., 2004a). This
prediction is based on the assumption that the value assignedto external events by the evaluative system that produces the
fERN is linearly related to the objective value of those events.
Fig. 3a illustrates the adaptive critic model that implements
this assumption, as described in the artificial intelligence
literature (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Here, the reward variable R
ranges continuously from −1 (punishment) to +1 (reward) and
is converted by the adaptive critic into the temporal difference
error TD. This theoretical framework was reflected in the
original computational models of phasic midbrain dopamine
activity in the monkey (Barto, 1995; Montague et al., 1996) and
has been themainstay of computationalmodels of this system
since (see Suri, 2002 for review). As originally proposed, the
theory holds that primary reward signals are carried via limbic
inputs into the basal ganglia, which implement the adaptive
critic (Barto, 1995). The basal ganglia compute errors in reward
prediction and broadcast these signals to other neural areas as
phasic changes in the activity of the midbrain dopamine
system. Note that according to this position, the basal ganglia
constitute a rather dumb computational workhorse: They do
not determine which outcomes are “good” or “bad” in and of
themselves (which is the responsibility of the limbic inputs to
the basal ganglia) but rather learn through a conditioning
process which ongoing events predict those outcomes.
Unstated in these models is the assumption that the limbic
reward input is more or less linearly related to the “objective”
value of the primary rewards. Thus, for example, two drops of
juice would be worth about twice as much as one drop of juice
to a thirsty monkey.
Fig. 3 – Adaptive critic models. (a) Standard adaptive critic
model that computes the temporal difference error TD from
the primary reward value R. (b) Modified adaptive critic
model that computes the temporal difference error TD from
the output f(R) of a cognitive preprocessing system.
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ogy experiments are rarely required to work for primary
rewards. Instead, they are typically exposed to abstract
feedback stimuli that function as secondary reinforcers for
other things, often money, which itself is a secondary
reinforcer. In other tasks, the stimuli constitute abstract
performance feedback that indicate success and failure with-
out any implied financial gain or loss. In all these cases, the
human cognitive system must attribute the significance to
these abstract external events: The system determines which
events are “good” and which are “bad”. The results of its
determination cannot be a linear function of “objective”
reward value because reward preference is intrinsically
subjective. For example, consider the outcomes of obtaining
correct feedback on the one hand (which presumably would
please an experimenter) vs. obtaining error feedback on the
other hand (which, if associated with speeded responses, may
enable a participant to finish the experimental session
sooner). Which of the two outcomes can be said to be
objectively “better”? Clearly, people adopt short-term goals
that they use to navigate the particular environmental
contexts in which they find themselves, but which may be
only loosely related to the apparent “objective” values
associated with the delivery of specific rewards and punish-
ments. Our previous results have suggested that the manner
in which particular task outcomes are categorized depends
sensitively on the experimental context, such that even small
variations in the range of possible outcomes can affect how
the outcomes are classified (Hajcak et al., in press).
If the adaptive critic does not receive reward signals that
are linearly related to an objective reward value, then the
scenario presented in Fig. 3a is an oversimplification. Instead,
the apparent situation is illustrated in Fig. 3b, which shows
that the external input R is first evaluated by a cognitive
system. This cognitive system establishes the goals for the
present task context – for example, to earn as much bonusmoney as possible – and produces as output some function f(R)
that indicates whether or not the goal has been satisfied. In
turn, this information is communicated to the adaptive critic,
which computes the TD error on this binary quantity. With
respect to the present series of experiments, if negative and
neutral feedback stimuli are grouped into a single category by
the cognitive system, then the RL-ERN theory would predict
that negative and neutral feedback stimuli should elicit
equally large fERNs, both of which are larger than that elicited
by positive feedback stimuli. To be concrete: if the cognitive
system assigns a value of “0” to both negative and neutral
feedback stimuli, and a value of “1” to positive feedback
stimuli, and if each of these feedback types occur with equal
probability, then the adaptive critic will come to predict
positive feedback with a probability of 1/3. In this case, both
negative and neutral feedback stimuli would be equally
unexpected (eliciting a TD error of −1/3), and positive feedback
stimuli would be better than expected (eliciting a TD error of
+2/3).
The obvious question is, how does the cognitive system
determine the goals? This question is beyond the scope of
these adaptive critic models, which simulate the function of a
simple “bottom up” predictive mechanism (Egelman et al.,
1998). In fact, it is safe to say that this is the outstanding issue
in cognitive control research, as it relates to how individuals
come to adopt particular task sets (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
This question notwithstanding, ample evidence indicates that
the basal ganglia operate in accordance with cognitive input
that they receive from cortex. In particular, we have suggested
that task-related goals are communicated to basal ganglia via
the recurrent “loops” that link prefrontal cortex and the
striatum via the thalamus (Holroyd et al., 2005). Consistent
with this position, both prefrontal lesions and basal ganglia
lesions disrupt the ERN, suggesting that these fronto-striato-
thalamo-cortical loops are necessary to generate this ERP
component (Ullsperger and von Cramon, in press). Further, the
results of a hemodynamic neuroimaging study have indicated
that the activity of the human midbrain dopamine system is
sensitive to abstract performance feedback (Aron et al., 2004).
These observations suggest that, whether or not the basal
ganglia indeed perform a “bottom-up” computation of pre-
dicted reward, their function is also guided by “top-down”
influences from cortex.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that other aspects of the
RL-ERN theory have also been challenged recently, including
whether or not the fERN in fact reflects a prediction error
(Hajcak et al., 2005); whether it depends on a behavioral
response (Yeung et al., 2005); whether it is generated by the
anterior cingulate cortex (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b; Van Veen
et al., 2004); whether it is functionally identical with the
“response error-related negativity” (response ERN), an ERP
component associated with error commission (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2004);whether the response ERN is related to error
processing (Vidal et al., 2003); and whether the reinforcement
process implemented by anterior cingulate cortex depends on
midbrain dopamine (Walton et al., 2005). These issues are
further complicated by the problem of component overlap of
the fERN with other ERP components that are also elicited by
feedback stimuli, namely the N200 and P300 (Holroyd, 2004).
Answers to these questions await further research.
100 B R A I N R E S E A R C H 1 1 0 5 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 9 3 – 1 0 1It is interesting to consider these results in the light of other
biophysical evidence related to task context and reward
processing. The RL-ERN theory holds that the value of ongoing
events are evaluated in the basal ganglia, and that the fERN is
elicited by the impact of phasic activity of the midbrain
dopamine system onmotor-related areas in anterior cingulate
cortex (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Consistent with this position
and with the evidence presented in this study, a replication of
the Holroyd et al. (2004a) study in a human fMRI experiment
indicated that reward-sensitive areas in the basal ganglia –
especially the globus pallidus and caudate nucleus – appear to
respond to rewards and punishments in a context-sensitive
and binary manner (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a). In monkeys, it
has been demonstrated that the midbrain dopamine system
carries phasic signals that indicate when ongoing events are
better or worse than the system expects; these errors signals
are made available to other neural systems for the purpose of
reinforcement (reviewed in Montague et al., 2004; Schultz,
2002). Further, these phasic dopamine signals are, like the
fERN, sensitive to the ongoing experimental context (Naka-
hara et al., 2004; Tobler et al., 2005). Unlike the fERN, however,
the dopamine signals appear to be sensitive to gradations in
the reward value of the outcome, with intermediate outcomes
eliciting intermediate levels of phasic dopamine activity.
Likewise, single-unit error-related activity in the monkey
cingulate motor areas is modulated by the magnitude of the
expected reward (Amiez et al., 2005). It is interesting to
speculate that whereas in the monkey, this evaluative system
may be relatively sensitive to the apparently objective value of
the rewards, in the human, this systemmay be predisposed to
classify outcomes into two categories: as those events that
clearly indicate that a task goal has been satisfied, and as
those events that do not.Acknowledgments
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